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Redressing Human Rights Abuses*
JON M. VAN DYKE**
GERALD W. BERKLEY***
I. INTRODUCTION
When an authoritarian regime that has engaged in gross violations of
fundamental human rights is replaced by a freely elected government
committed to the rule of law and fair procedures, how should the new
government handle the violations of the previous regime? This question
has challenged the new governments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile
directly, and has also been a issue recently in other Latin American na-
tions such as Brazil, Paraguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and El
Salvador. European countries such as Spain, Greece, and the nations of
Eastern Europe have also had to grapple with this question, as have
Asian countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, and others.
Each of these nations has considered this problem in the context of
its unique situation. Their actions have been affected by the level of
"grossness" of the human rights abuses, the extent to which their new
government is stable and secure, the extent to which members of the pre-
vious government retain positions of power, and the state of the nation's
economy. The national responses have ranged from a total disregard of
past human rights abuses to the prosecution of all primarily responsible.
A number of human rights scholars and activists have written re-
cently on these diverse reactions, and they have almost uniformly con-
cluded that each nation has an obligation to prosecute their violators.
This conclusion, although certainly moral and just, is apparently not real-
istic as a practical matter for many nations. It is necessary, therefore, for
other nations and the international community as a whole to assist by
providing tribunals and forums for prosecutions. This paper surveys the
national responses that have thus far occurred, reviews the recent litera-
ture on this topic, and offers some recommendations about how the inter-
national community can assist.
II. THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE REDRESS FOR GROSS ABUSES
A rich literature has emerged in the last several years from the
human rights community arguing that international law requires govern-
ments to act affirmatively to punish those who have committed gross
* This article was presented at the conference held in honor of the late Senator Spark
M. Matsunga, entitled "Restructuring for Peace: Challenges for the 21st Century," held in
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** Professor of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
*** Professor of History, University of Guam.
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human rights abuses.' The arguments in favor of prosecuting the culprits
who have used official positions to violate the rights of citizens are simple
and straightforward:
1. To deter future violations of fundamental human rights.2
2. To reassert the central role of law in civilized society, to foster respect
for democratic institutions and advance the nation's transition (or return)
to democracy, and clearly distinguish between the previous regime and
the new government.
3
3. To reassert the inherent dignity of each individual by providing the
victims and their families their day in court."
4. To provide a complete and irrefutable record of what happened, so
that no one can pretend the abuses did not occur.'
5. To comply with obligations of international law.
The argument that international law requires prosecution is devel-
oped in detail in several recent articles.' These commentators identify
1. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 136-245 (1989) (Chapter III is entitled "Responsibility of States for Violations of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms"); Alejandro Garro & Enrique Dahl, Legal Ac-
countability For Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and Two Steps
Back, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283 (1987); Ellen Lutz, After the Elections: Compensating Victims
of Human Rights Abuses, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 195 (E. Lutz, H. Hannum
& K. Burke eds., 1989); George C. Rogers, Argentina's Obligation to Prosecute Military
Officials for Torture, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (1989); Jamie Malamud-Goti, Tran-
sitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1
(1990); Kathryn Lee Crawford, Due Obedience and the Rights of Victims: Argentina's
Transition to Democracy, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 17 (1990); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsi-
bility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law,
78 CAL. L. REV. 451 (1990); Ricardo Antonio Latcham, Duty to Punish: International Law
and Human Rights Policy of Argentina, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 355 (1990); Symposium, Transi-
tions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 965 (1990) [hereinafter
cited as American University Symposium] (see especially Remarks of Nigel Rodley at 1044-
48, remarks of Diane Orentlicher at 1049-58, remarks of Juan Mendez at 1058-61, remarks
of Lawrence Weschler at 1061-63, remarks of Hurst Hannum at 1080-83); Diane Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
2. 7 See, e.g., Malamud-Goti, supra note 1, at 11-12; Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2542.
3. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2542-44; Malamud-Goti, supra note 1, at 11-
12; Rogers, supra note 1, at 300-4.
4. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2544 n.22.
5. See, e.g., Malamud-Goti, supra note 1, at 11; Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2546 n.32.
6. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 1; Orentlicher, supra note 1; Meron, supra note 1;
Crawford, supra note 1, at 44-49; Rogers, supra note 1, at 272-91; Rodley, in American
University Symposium, supra note 1, at 1044-48. One dissenting perspective has been of-
fered by Professor Hurst Hannum, who said in 1990 that he thought the "conclusion that
punishment of human rights violators was required under international law ... cannot be
sustained at the present time." Professor Hannum also said that he was "quite attracted to
Diane Orentlicher's suggestion that 'wholesale impunity' . . . might be an illegal abdication
of international responsibility, but I think we are far from having achieved customary inter-
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several specific human rights treaties that contain an explicit duty to
prosecute violators' and also contend that other comprehensive human
rights treaties8 establish an affirmative duty to protect human rights
which includes investigating abuses and punishing wrongdoers. One com-
mentator states, for instance, that:
Authoritative interpretations make clear, however, that these treaties
require States Parties generally to investigate serious violations of
physical integrity - in particular, torture, extra-legal executions, and
forced disappearances - and to bring to justice those who are respon-
sible. The rationale behind these duties is straightforward: prosecu-
tion and punishment are the most effective - and therefore only ade-
quate - means of ensuring a narrow class of rights that merit special
protection.'
The recent decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
the Velasquez Rodriguez Case'0 is cited in support of this conclusion. In
a case involving an unresolved disappearance in Honduras, the Court said
that the American Convention on Human Rights imposed on each state
party a:
legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations
and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investiga-
tion of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those
responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation."
Customary international law can also be cited to support the proposition
that prosecutions are required in cases of serious violations of the right to
physical integrity, as exemplified by the prosecutions after World War II
at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 2
As persuasive as these arguments are, it is also possible to identify
national law that any foreign ministry in any country in the world would consider itself
bound by." Id.
7. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
G.A. Res. 260A (III), 7 U.N.T.S. 227; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), entered into force June 26, 1987,
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
8. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter
"ICCPR"], done at New York, Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976, U.N.G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in
6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969,
entered into force, July 18, 1978, 36 O.A.S. Treaty Series 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/
11.23 doc. rev. 2, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
9. Orentlicher, supra note 1.
10. Judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Ser. c/4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291
(1989).
11. Id. at 174.
12. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2585-95.
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substantial arguments against prosecutions:
1. "Fragile democracies may not be able to survive the destabilizing ef-
fects of politically charged trials."' 3
2. Even in more stable countries, protracted trials may make it harder to
heal the wounds that have divided a country. Protracted trials will pro-
mote the "psychology of vengeance and hatred," which will divide rather
than unite a people and will interfere with nation-building and economic
development.1
3. Authoritarian regimes that face "a virtual certainty of punishment"
will resist "voluntarily relinquishing power.'
5
Some commentators who argue that prosecutions are not always war-
ranted contend that many of the goals of prosecutions can be achieved by
a thorough investigation that lays out the facts but does not take the
additional step of punishing the wrongdoers.' 6 This approach has been
pursued in Chile.' 7 It has also been pointed out that punishment need not
always take the form of criminal prosecution and incarceration, but can
also include loss of rank, job, or pension rights, and monetary fines which
can be used to compensate victims and their families."8
The next section describes what has happened in some of the coun-
tries that have moved from authoritarian regimes to democratic govern-
ance in recent years. Their methods of dealing with leaders in the author-
itarian regime who have violated human rights has varied dramatically
from the swift and sure prosecutions in Greece against the top "Colo-
nels,"' 9 to the general amnesty in Uruguay,2" to ignoring the problem al-
together in several countries. The one lesson that seems clear from these
descriptions is that some help will be needed from regional and interna-
tional human rights bodies, and from the national courts of other coun-
tries, if the apparent requirement of international law that human rights
violators be pursued and punishment is to be given real teeth.
13. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2544. This argument has been used, for instance, in
Uruguay and the Philippines. See infra notes 39-50 and 103-4 and accompanying text.
14. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2550, quoting a statement made by Polish activist
Adam Michnik in Lawrence Weschler, A Reporter At Large, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10,
1990, at 127.
15. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2549.
16. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2546 n.32; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 1, at
508-09.
17. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
18. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 1, at 509.
19. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
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III. WHAT HAS ACTUALLY HAPPENED
A. Latin America"1
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and - perhaps
more ambiguously - El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama
have each moved from an entrenched military dictatorship to elected ci-
vilian rule in the last few years. Each nation has had to confront the
human rights abuses of the former dictatorships and each has developed
its own strategy for addressing this difficult problem. The widely differing
approaches taken by each country illustrate the challenges presented.
1. Argentina
Several different military juntas dominated the Argentine govern-
ment between 1976 and 1983. Arguing that they were waging a "war
against subversion," the military personnel of these juntas forcibly ab-
ducted somewhere between 9,000 and 30,000 Argentine citizens during
this period.22 Several hundred military officers reportedly planned this
strategy, and many of these individuals also participated in the torture
sessions which frequently followed the kidnappings.2 3
The loss of the war with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas
(Falkland) Islands in 1982 caused the junta to lose popular support, and
civilian rule was restored with the election of Raul Alfonsin as President
at the end of 1983. His election brought forth immediate demands both
from the families of those who had disappeared (desaparecidos) and from
various human rights organizations to prosecute those responsible for the
human rights abuses of the past. President Alfonsin responded with a
plan to investigate and initiate criminal proceedings against those consid-
ered liable. A decree was issued authorizing the arrest and prosecution of
nine junta leaders in power between 1976 and 1983.24
The Argentine Congress then approved further action. Their law pro-
21. For a comprehensive survey of available Latin American human rights resources,
see Perkins, Latin American Human Rights Research 1980-89: A Guide to Sources and a
Bibliography, 19 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 163 (1990).
22. The exact number of the "disappeared," a euphemism for the forced and unac-
knowledged abduction of persons by the state military, security, or police forces, or by other
state-sanctioned groups, is disputed. The National Commission on the Disappearance of
Persons, NUNCA MAS 10 479-81 (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, trans. eds. 1986). See Osiel,
The Making of Human Rights Policy in Argentina: The Impact of Ideas and Interests on a
Legal Conflict, 18 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 135 (1986). See generally Rogers, supra note 1;
Malamud-Goti, supra note 1; Crawford, supra note 1; Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish
Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J.
2619 (1991); and Judgment on Human Rights Violations by Former Military Leaders,
Suprema Corte de Argentina, Dec. 30, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 317 (1987).
23. Osiel, supra note 22, at 141; Emilio F. Mignone, Cynthia L. Estlund & Samuel Is-
sacharoff, Dictatorship on Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights Violations in Argentina, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 118, 119 (1984).
24. Garro & Dahl, supra note 1, at 284. See also Latcham, supra note 1, at 357.
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vided a rebuttable presumption of innocence for military personnel acting
under orders from a superior officer, but this presumption did not extend
to those who were found guilty of committing "atrocious or aberrant" acts
such as torture.2 5 Original jurisdiction was given to Argentina's highest
military tribunal, with the proviso that if that court's actions were unjus-
tifiably or negligently delayed, the Federal Chamber of Appeals would
assume jurisdiction.
Alfonsin, hoping to reduce the military's alienation, announced that
he would limit prosecutions to those most responsible for authorizing the
abuses and those who actually committed the most egregious violations.
Unfortunately, this strategy failed, because it badly miscalculated the Ar-
gentine military's willingness to have any of its members prosecuted.
Their position manifested itself in the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces' refusal to continue proceedings against the junta leaders."
The Federal Chamber of Appeals then assumed authority over these
cases as the statute authorized. Several additional indictments were
handed down, and public trials commenced in April 1985. Six months
later, five of the defendants were convicted. The Argentine press carried
daily accounts of the trials, and huge rallies occurred at which thousands
of the nation's citizens demanded justice."
The military, its sense of persecution and alienation heightened by
the constant publicity, reacted with threats of violence. The Argentine
Congress, in an attempt to defuse the situation, then passed a "Full
Stop" law which imposed a 60-day deadline for filing additional com-
plaints or charges against any alleged perpetrators. 8 This strategy also
failed. Special prosecutors and human rights activists worked day and
night to draft as many indictments as possible. The military rose in
insurrection.
With few options available to him, President Alfonsin reached an
agreement whereby in exchange for a halt to the rebellion a law was en-
acted that exonerated all military personnel below the rank of brigadier
general from any criminal liability for acts committed between 1976 and
1983. This law also created an irrebuttable presumption that lower-rank-
ing officers were merely following orders or acting under other modes of
duress. Accordingly, about 400 officers and enlisted personnel who had
been subject to prosecution were granted immunity, leaving fewer than
25. Law 23049, art. 11. "Torture ... is widely agreed to be so manifestly illegal an act
that no officer could reasonably be presumed to have been unaware of the criminality of
such an order." Osiel, supra note 22, at 147. See also Carlos Santiago Nino, The Human
Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitutional Government: A Reply, 11 YALE J. INT'L L.
217, 228 (1985).
26. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 23, at 125-38.
27. Osiel, supra note 22, at 142; Garro & Dahl, supra note 1, at 287; Latcham, supra
note 1, at 361. The demonstrations regularly drew as many as 70,000 supporters.
28. Law No. 23492, (Dec. 23, 1986)(Law of "Full Stop"), translated in 8 HuM. RTs. L.J.
476 (1987).
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fifty officers to stand accountable for the disappearance, torture, and
death of thousands of Argentine citizens. 9
In May 1989, Carlos Menem replaced Alfonsin as the elected presi-
dent of Argentina. On October 6, 1989, pressured by riots and hyper-in-
flation, President Menem pardoned both those already convicted and the
remaining thirty senior military officers who were to have been tried. Two
federal public prosecutors who challenged the constitutionality of this ac-
tion were threatened with disciplinary hearings and dismissal because
they ignored orders from the Argentine Attorney General to say nothing.
The pardons ended all but one of the criminal prosecutions of those re-
sponsible for the human rights abuses of the past. The only trial that
remained on the docket was that of Guillermo Suarez Mason, former
Commander of the First Army Corps, 0 and he was also later pardoned.,"
2. Chile
General Augusto Pinochet seized power during the 1973 overthrow of
elected President Salvador Allende. During the more than 16 years of
harsh military rule that followed, thousands of Chileans suffered gross
human rights abuses. On March 11, 1989, President Patricio Aylwin took
power after the first free election since 1971.1' President Aylwin found
himself in a very difficult position with regard to the abuses of the Pi-
nochet period. The new Chilean Constitution, written mostly to General
Pinochet's specifications, leaves the General with substantial residual
power. Not only does he have the authority to hand-pick nine members of
the 48-seat Senate, but General Pinochet himself remains as chief of the
Army. In addition, General Pinochet provided an amnesty during his
reign for human rights abuses committed before 1978.- 8
Pinochet's continuing power was assumed to stand in the way of
meeting the demands for justice and retribution by those who had suf-
fered torture, imprisonment, and exile, and by the relatives of those who
were murdered or "disappeared" during the 1973 to 1989 period. Presi-
dent Aylwin, however, courageously appointed an independent body, the
Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, made up of prominent public
29. Crawford, supra note 1, at 25.
30. Argentina's Phony "Reconciliation," WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1991, at A22; Daniel
Drosdoff, Menem Pardons: A Bid for Military Support, UNITED PREsS INT'L, Jan. 1, 1991;
Argentina Decrees Explain Why Former Military Leaders Were Pardoned, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTs/THE MONITORING REP., Jan. 1, 1991, at ME/0959/iii; Cristina
Bonasegna, Critics Denounce Argentina's "Dirty War" Pardons, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR,
Dec. 31, 1990, at 4.
31. Suarez Mason had been extradited from the United States in 1988 where he had
fled to avoid prosecution. See Daniel Drosdoff, U.S.-Argentina Ties Strained, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Jan. 9, 1991.
32. Tom Wicker, "Middle Way" in Chile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at A25, col. 1.
Thomas Boadle, Chilean Government Moves to Defuse Explosive Rights Issue, REUTERS
LIaR. REP., Apr. 23, 1990.
33. Wicker, supra note 32.
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figures, who were charged with investigating and disclosing the facts of
Pinochet's human rights transgressions.34 This group was not given the
authority to fix blame or recommend prosecution, in an apparent conces-
sion to Pinochet's threat that the day one of his men was touched, the
rule of law in Chile would end.
3 5
On March 5, 1991, President Aylwin went on national television in
Chile to reveal to the people of his country what the Commission had
discovered after nine months of investigation. 6 The first 1,094 pages of
the report defined concepts and described the historical, political, judi-
cial, and institutional framework in which the events took place, and then
recounted, in chronological order, all the cases in which the Commission
determined that a human rights violation resulted in the death or disap-
pearance of identified victims. It also provided a report on the back-
ground and circumstance of each abuse.
Three distinct time periods were identified. During the first - Sep-
tember 11 to December 31, 1973 - massive detentions and the executions
of many political prisoners occurred. The second period - January 1974
to August 1977 - was the DINA (National Intelligence Directorate) era,
when systematic action was taken to exterminate those considered politi-
cally dangerous. The largest number of "disappearances" took place dur-
ing this period. The third period - September 1977 to 1983 - featured
attacks on terrorists groups and the repression of protests.
The total number of victims of gross violations of human rights, ac-
cording to the Commission, was more than 2,000 for all three periods: 59
killed after a court-martial; 90 killed during protests; 101 killed while at-
tempting to avoid capture; 815 died as a result of torture; 957 "disap-
peared;" and 90 killed by attacks carried out by politically motivated
civilians.
The next seventy-four pages of the Report recommended types of
reparations and vindications to impede or prevent future human rights
violations. Noting that both moral and material compensation was abso-
lutely necessary for the transition towards true democracy, the Commis-
sion proposed the public vindication of the victims' good names, and the
establishment by law of a single reparation pension designed to provide
relatives of the victims with special health, education, and housing bene-
fits. The Commission also proposed the creation of an autonomous
human rights foundation that would continue the task of trying to deter-
mine the whereabouts of the disappeared, and keep records of human
rights abuses.3 7 The final 635 pages of the Report contain brief biographi-
34. Id. See also Paul Mylread, Chile's Government Seeks to Heal Scars of Military
Rule, REUTERS LIBR. REP., Apr. 23, 1990.
35. Ariel Dorfman, Perspective on Chile, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1991, at B7, col. 3.
36. Chilean President's Address and Comments on Human Rights Violations Report,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 6, 1991, at ME/1013/D/1.
37. Id. See also Leslie Crawford, Chile's Litany of Torture Becomes Contested History,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at 8.
VOL. 20:2
REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
cal data, in alphabetical order, for each of the individuals who, in the
Commission's judgment, died or disappeared as victims of violations of
their human rights.
This Report is an extraordinary indictment of the Pinochet dictator-
ship's cruelty, its systematic policy of terror, and its incessant lies; it had
the streets and cafes of Chile abuzz with talk. Not only was the wall of
silence removed, but the military's desecration of Chile is now an official
truth in the public domain. The reality belongs to all and can be denied
by none, although not surprisingly General Pinochet has said that "The
army denies the report both historical and juridical validity.","
3. Uruguay
In contrast to most of its neighbors, Uruguay was profoundly com-
mitted to a pluralistic democracy during the first half of this century.
With its relatively small population of less than three million, Uruguay
served as an oasis of tolerance surrounded by a desert of repression. Un-
fortunately, in the 1960's this began to change."
Uruguay's civilian government proved incapable of handling a deep-
ening economic crisis, and an urban-based guerrilla movement, the
Tupamaros, began to emerge. In 1973, the country's military commanders
took charge. Congress was disbanded, and the nation's long-cherished
human rights were suspended. During the next ten years, according to
Amnesty International, Uruguay acquired the dubious distinction of hav-
ing the world's highest per-capita rate of political incarceration. Although
relatively few "disappearances" or killings occurred, one out of every 50
Uruguayans was detained at some point between 1973 and 1985. Torture
was pervasive - virtually everyone arrested was tortured.
40
Finally, in March 1985, after prolonged negotiations, the military dic-
tatorship relinquished enough power so that a democratically elected gov-
ernment could assume office. Julio Maria Sanguinetti, a center-right cor-
porate attorney who had been heavily involved in the bargaining for the
return to civilian rule, was chosen by the people of Uruguay as their Pres-
ident. Almost immediately an amnesty covering all political prisoners was
granted.'1
38. Malcolm Coad, Chile To Press Rights Probes Despite Pinochet's Criticism, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A17.
39. Lawrence Weschler, A Reporter at Large: The Great Exception, THE NEW YORKER,
April 10, 1989, at 85 (Part I appeared in THE NEW YORKER, April 3, 1989).
40. Id. See also David Kennedy, Spring Break (Visiting a Political Prisoner in Uru-
guay), 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (1985); Uruguay: Encouraging Return to Democracy, 34 INT'L
COMMISSION OF JURISTS 20 (1985); Camille Jones, Human Rights: Rights of Relatives of Vic-
tims (Uruguay), 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 470 (1984); Statement By Senator Dr. Alberto
Zumaran, Special Representative of His Government of Uruguay to the United Nations
Commission of Human Rights, Mar. 8, 1985 (transcript), 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 574 (1985).
41. Statement by Dr. Zumaran, supra note 40, at 579; Uruguay: Encouraging Return
to Democracy, supra note 40, at 23-24.
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Between the spring of 1985 and the final days of 1986, a flood of
criminal complaints against the military concerning gross human rights
violations clogged the judicial system. High ranking military officers, who
were still powerful and totally unrepentant, simply refused to allow any-
one serving under them to honor the subpoenas requiring court appear-
ances. In reaction, on December 22, 1986, the Sanguinetti Government
passed a "Law Declaring an Expiration of the State's Punitive Author-
ity," which in effect granted total amnesty to those responsible for past
human rights abuses.42
Senator Manuel Flores Silva, a journalist and professor, who voted in
favor of this 1986 law, explained his position as follows:
Uruguay lived through a transition from authoritarian rule which
was not at all typical. We didn't have the benefit of the classic situa-
tion in which the dictatorship suffers an external defeat, like Argen-
tina in the Malvinas or the Greek generals in Cyprus, and therefore
has to step down. We didn't have the other classic way out, either, in
which the dictatorship loses as a result of an internal war, as hap-
pened in Nicaragua with the downfall of Somoza. Our way was to mo-
bilize civil society and gradually encircle the regime until it accepted
the transition.
The trouble is that by mid-1986 we were falling back into the
logic of extremes. Ironically, dictatorships freeze things, and, coming
out of ours, we almost seemed to be back in 1972 and 1973 - the
same hatreds and polarizations all over again, leading toward an iden-
tical impasse and an identical probable outcome. We had to find a
way out of that trap. It was very important, because it hasn't been
shown anywhere that there is a law according to which dictatorships
automatically fall. Sometimes they don't fall. For us to present an am-
nesty project, therefore, was not a matter of doing the necessary dirty
work. It was a matter of making a moral decision to give priority to
the possibility of a future of agreement over a past of division.
43
Vice-President Enrique Tarigo, a journalist and lawyer who also sup-
ported the 1986 amnesty, rationalized his decision as follows:
To secure convictions against, say, fifty military people, we would
have had to have at least five hundred officers parading through the
courts - as accused, as suspects, as accomplices, or, at any rate, as
witnesses. It would have taken anywhere from four to eight years, be-
cause that's how long a penal process does take.... And I don't think
any state can withstand having its armed forces destroyed in such a
fashion.
44
42. Weschler, supra note 39, at 85.
43. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 91.
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As to whether Uruguay could build a democracy after ignoring the
gross human rights violations of the past, Tarigo responded:
When Franco died [in Spain], a new page was turned, because
everybody realized that to go back and review events of forty years
earlier would provoke a whole new civil war. Life continues, life is
made up of things that are not pretty, that are not the subject of a
beautiful poem. And the function of government is not to write poetry
but to build a real future."
President Sanguinetti argued that because all political prisoners had
been granted amnesty in March 1985, giving the military amnesty in
1986:
was a question of moral equivalency: we felt that if we were going
to a settling of accounts for the left and the terrorists the military
should be amnestied too .... 11
We could have had a moral trial, an investigation followed by an
amnesty. But that situation had all the problems and none of the ad-
vantages. To open that discussion would have been to preserve old
wounds .... The experience of Argentina confirms it: the trials there
were not permitted to continue - only the top generals were pun-
ished, and not those directly responsible for all the assassinations.'
Sanguinetti felt that a year and a half of controversy was enough, and
that it was time to move on: "[I]t was time for a punto final (full stop). I
don't have eyes in the back of my head. I have eyes only for the future.""8
Many Uruguayans disagreed with these views. They favored a com-
mission of inquiry, an officially sanctioned truth telling. Some wanted tri-
als and verdicts. Accordingly, they challenged the "Law Declaring an Ex-
piration of the State's Punitive Authority" under a constitutional
provision allowing a referendum on any law if 25 percent of the registered
voters so request. Just before Christmas 1987, and after a heated petition
drive that was marked by repeated governmental attempts to disqualify
voters' signatures, over 637,702 signatures were turned into the Electoral
Court, more than enough to force the referendum. The government's ini-
tial response was to try a filibuster. Every one of the signatures was re-
viewed twice, and then, finally, checked against the original of the signer's
registration papers. While this was going on, Sanguinetti took to the Uru-
guayan airwaves to remind the people of the problems that had occurred




47. Id. at 92
48. Id. at 86-87.
49. Id. at 87-88. See also Washington Varela, The Referendum Campaign in Uruguay:
An Unprecedented Challenge to Impunity, 13 H.R.I. REP. 16 (1989). Varela makes the
point that no other country in Latin America has a referendum provision such as Uruguay's.
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Next the Electoral Court announced that it would accept retractions
of signatures from those so inclined. Finally, on April 16, 1989, after more
government-backed scare campaigns, the referendum was held and the
attempt to overturn the 1986 amnesty was defeated. A strong minority of
42 percent had, however, supported repeal of the "Law Declaring an Ex-
piration of the State's Punitive Authority.""0
4. Brazil
A military dictatorship ruled Brazil betwenn 1964 and 1985. Al-
though not as brutal as some in the region, these military leaders were
responsible for the deaths of about 200 people, the disappearance of an-
other 150, and the torture of thousands. Negotiated civilian rule returned
in 1985, but with the understanding that the new government would not
investigate or try the former military officials."
In March 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello took office as Brazil's first
directly elected president since 1960. He had promised the people of Bra-
zil that he would abolish the National Intelligence Service, the former
dictatorship's secret police force which was responsible for most of the
past human rights violations. In September 1990, a mass grave containing
more than 1,700 bodies was discovered. Most were the remains of pau-
pers, but about 50 were apparently the victims of summary execution
during the military rule.2 The painful memories stirred by this discovery
caused many Brazilians to demand a full investigation.
5. Paraguay
In February 1989, the reign of the Western Hemisphere's most dura-
ble dictator ended. General Alfredo Stroessner, who first took power in a
coup in August 1954, had utilized repression to resist any movement to-
ward democracy in Paraguay for nearly 35 years. Declining health and
attempts to transfer leadership to his son prompted a fierce military coup
He also quotes Sanguinetti as saying that the petition drive was a "Mission Impossible."
50. Varela, supra note 49, at 16. Amnesty International reacted to the Uruguayan refer-
endum with the following statement:
The results of the referendum cannot be interpreted as freeing the Govern-
ment of Uruguay of its international obligations, including the need to take
steps to make the truth about past criminal human rights violations such as
torture, "disappearances" and extra-judicial executions publicly known, to
bring those responsible for such violations to justice and to ensure that mea-
sures are taken to ensure that such abuses are not under any circumstances
tolerated in the future.
Remarks of Nigel Rodley, American University Symposium, supra note 1, at 1045 (1990). In
the most recent election, Sanguinetti's Colorado Party lost by a large percentage to the
opposition Blanco o Nacional Party. Remarks by the Honorable Didier Opertti, American
University Symposium, supra note 1, at 1042.
51. Old Fears Die Hard in Brazil, Cm. TRmB., Sept. 10, 1990, at 8.
52. Id.
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led by General Andres Rodriques.53
Within a week of the overthrow, tens of thousands of Paraguayans
took to the streets demanding an end to the corruption and violence, and
free and open elections. Unfortunately, General Rodriquez announced
that he intended to fill the remainder of Stroessner's term until 1993 and
indicated that political change would be neither sudden nor profound. He
did make a commitment to respect human rights and eventually bring
democracy to Paraguay, but has made no mention of any attempt to re-
dress past human rights violations.5 4 Time will tell. As for Stroessner, at
seventy-eight years of age he is in exile in Brasilia, but his ghosts, real
and imagined, continue to influence events in Paraguay.
5
6. Guatemala
During the intense, systematic repression of the successive military
regimes that ruled Guatemala from 1978 to 1985, it is estimated that
nearly 40,000 people disappeared. 8 A period described as a "Reign of Of-
ficial Terror" commenced in 1978 under General Lucas Garcia.5 7 All per-
sons suspected of harboring "dangerous" opinions were targeted. The two
military dictatorships that followed, the first in 1982 under General Rios
Mantt, and the second in 1983 under General Oscar Humberto Mejia
Victores, continued the use of violence as a means of social and political
control.5 8 In 1986, when President Cerezo took office as the first demo-
cratically elected civilian president in twenty years, some expressed hope
that the human rights abuses would cease and that some redress of the
past violations would be forthcoming. Unfortunately, although the mili-
tary had relinquished formal power in hopes of obtaining foreign aid, they
retained considerable actual authority. They enacted an amnesty law
(Decree Law 8-86) a few days before Cerezo's inauguration, and have seen
to it that no human rights investigations have occurred.,,
53. Stroessner Shows Force That Has Kept Him in Power 32 Years, REUTERS, June 25,
1986; Brian Nicholson, Paraguayans Await Changes in Wake of Coup, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Feb. 4, 1989.
54. James Smith, Military Coup Topples Paraguay's Stroessner; Incoming President
Promises Democracy, Respect for Rights, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1989, at 1, col. 2; James Smith,
Paraguay Ruler Denies Links to Drug Traffic, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989, at 5, col. 1; Peter
Bate, Opposition Stages First March After Stroessner's Downfall, REUTER LIBR. REP., Feb.
11, 1989; Peter Bate, Thousands of Paraguayans March to Mark Stroessner's Downfall,
REUTERS, Feb. 11, 1989.
55. James Brooke, Paraguay Jittery Over The Exiled Stroessner, N.Y. TIMES (Nat'l
ed.), Mar. 3, 1991, at A14, col. 3.
56. Central America Report (Infopress Centro Americana), Mar. 7, 1986, at 6.
57. GEORGE BLACK, GARRISON GUATEMALA 47 (1984).
58. Id.; See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
OF POLITICAL MURDER (1981).
59. William Schirmer, "Those Who Die for Life Cannot Be Called Dead:" Women and
Human Rights Protests in Latin America, 1 HuM. RTS. Y.B. 41, 59-60 (1988).
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7. Nicaragua
Between the time the Sandinista-led revolution toppled rightist dic-
tator Anastasio Somoza in 1979 and their subsequent loss of power in the
February 1989 general election, numerous instances of human rights
abuses occurred. Recent discoveries of clandestine graves have sparked
debate in President Violeta Chamorro's government over whether the
human rights violations committed by both the Sandinistas and their op-
position, the Contras, should be investigated and prosecuted or forgiven
and forgotten in a spirit of national reconciliation. 0
The Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights, founded in 1986 with
U.S. funding to educate and monitor the Contras on human rights, and
the Nicaraguan Centre for Human Rights, funded by Dutch nongovern-
mental organizations and international church groups, are both active in
investigating and publicizing past abuses. 1 The latter group utilizes fo-
rensic experts from Argentina and Costa Rica.
Sweeping amnesty laws for political crimes were passed by both the
outgoing Sandinista-dominated assembly in March and the pro-Chamorro
assembly in May. These laws may or may not cover violations of interna-
tional human rights.6"
8. El Salvador
In October 1979, a group of young military officers ended the atroc-
ity-filled rule of General Carlos Humberto Romero. The new regime fre-
quently proclaimed ambitious plans to democratize the government of El
Salvador, but many members of this new government had, in fact, been
involved in the death squads of the past which were responsible for some
30,000 killings.6
In December 1981, the United States Congress, motivated at least in
part by continuing reports of human rights abuses in El Salvador, en-
acted an aid certification program that required periodic reviews of that
nation's domestic policies and activities. The President of the United
States was directed to determine whether the government of El Salvador
was making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internation-
ally recognized human rights norms.6 4 In late 1990, the U.S. Congress ac-
tually withheld $425 million in military aid after the El Salvador govern-
ment failed to prosecute vigorously the military men responsible for the
60. William Jacobsen, Clandestine Graves in Nicaragua Open Debate on War Crimes,
REUTERS LIBR. REP., Oct. 3, 1990. The original story concerning these graves may have been




63. Amy S. Griffin, Comment, Constitutional Impediments to Enforcing Human
Rights Legislation: The Case of El Salvador, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 163, 164 (1983).
64. Id. at 163, 173.
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deaths of six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter in November
1989.65
On March 10, 1991, the first relatively peaceful elections - after
thirteen years and some 75,000 deaths - were conducted in El Salvador.
These elections were for legislative seats and municipal posts, and actu-
ally succeeded in reintroducing some diversity into El Salvador's polit-
ics.8 6 As a further ray of hope, almost immediately after this plebiscite, a
United Nations human rights fact-finding team visited the country with
the aim of initiating a full-scale U.N. monitoring of human rights in El
Salvador. Both sides of the current civil war, the U.S.-backed government
and the leftist guerrillas (FMLN), requested the U.N. action. 7
9. Panama
In 1968, the military took charge of the government of Panama under
General Omar Torrijos. After Torrijos' death in a 1981 plane crash, Gen-
eral Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander of the Panama Defense Forces,
quickly deposed two military rivals to achieve power behind a succession
of civilian presidents. Human rights abuses, sporadic under Torrijos, es-
calated rapidly under Noriega6 8
Serious attempts to topple Noriega commenced in March 1988. Dem-
onstrations, strikes, coup attempts, and a United States-engineered cash
crisis all failed to dislodge the General.6 9 Finally, on December 20, 1989,
U.S. forces drove Noriega from power and replaced him with a three-
party coalition.7 0 Within six months, however, one of the three top lead-
ers, Ricardo Arias Calderon, had begun rebuilding the military with many
of the same officers and men who had made up Noriega's corrupt and
brutal Panama Defense Forces. 71 In April 1991, several U.N. human
rights officials stated that the government of Panama has a duty at least
to investigate all violations of human rights since 1968, but no such action
65. Lyng-how Ramirez, United States: New Debate in Congress Over Aid to El Salva-
dor, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1991.
66. Bleeding Toward Peace - Exhaustion Could End El Salvador's Civil War, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at A14.
67. U.N. Rights Team Ends Fact-Finding Mission to El Salvador, REUTERS LIBR. REP.,
Mar. 22, 1991.
68. Richard Boudreaux, Panama Suspends Rights, Jails Scores to Quell Unrest, L.A.
TIMES, June 12, 1987, at 1, col. 5; Doctors Begin Autopsy of Body of Panama Supreme
Court Justice, REUTERS, Nov. 2, 1987.
69. Bernard Debusmann, Panama Declares Emergency, Suspends Basic Civil Rights,
REUTERS, Mar. 18, 1988; William Branigan, Strike Aimed at Ousting Noriega Begins Today,
WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1988, at A13; Dan Williams, Church Pressed to Take Active Panama
Role, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1988, at Al, col. 4; Lionel Barber, U.S. Takes Fresh Tack in Bid
to Oust Noriega, FIN. TIMES, at 5; Robert Pear, Hemispheric Group Asks Noriega to Yield
Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1989, at A8, col. 3.
70. Helen Dewar & Tom Kenworthy, Decision Was Made Necessary by the Reckless
Actions of General Noriega, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1989, at A35.
71. Kenneth Freed, Noriega Officers Resurface; Panama Coalition Strained, L.A.
TIMES, June 25, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
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has yet taken place."2
B. Europe
Several European countries have recently struggled with these same
questions of how to redress past human rights as they have moved from
dictatorship to democracy. Their approaches have been mixed. Spain, be-
cause of the nature of the Spanish Civil War, the long Franco regime that
followed and the negotiated nature of the transition to civilian rule, virtu-
ally ignored the human rights violations of the Franco period. Greece, on
the other hand, actively prosecuted those responsible for human rights
abuses during the 1960's under "the Colonels." For the newly emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe, the decision of how best to handle past
human rights transgressions has not yet been made.
1. Spain
Between 1924 and 1936, diverse ideological groups of the right and
left engaged in an intense political struggle in Spain, and in 1936, this
ideological conflict blossomed into a full-scale civil war." When the war
ended in 1939, the left was defeated and many leftists fled to exile. Gen-
eral Francisco Franco took power and for the next several years his brand
of fascist/military dictatorship engaged in gross human rights violations,
including arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture, and execution. Around
1960, however, a more moderate phase began. Opposition groups from the
Catholic Church, labor, and higher education succeeded in gaining some
concessions. The press and the media became more open, and democracy
was openly promoted in the universities. These accomplishments, how-
ever, did not signal a complete end to the repression. Arrest and prosecu-
tion of labor and student leaders continued, albeit sporadically.
74
When Franco finally died in 1975, enlightened leaders such as King
Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez deftly directed the transi-
tion to democracy. Juan Carlos championed rapid liberalization in both
work and deed. 5 Suarez installed liberal General Gutierrez Mellado as
Minister of Defense s. 7 Then Suarez, with United States support, cleverly
enveloped the Francoist military hierarchy in NATO. They became so ab-
sorbed in committees, meetings, and travel that the civilian government
72. Panama Urged to Investigate Civil Rights Abuses Past, REUTER LIaR. REP., Apr. 4,
1991.
73. The best account of the Spanish Civil War in English is H. THOMAS, THE SPANISH
CIVIL WAR (1986).
74. See generally THOMAS LANCASTER & GARY PREVOST, POLITICS AND CHANGE IN SPAIN
(1985). See also RAYMOND CARR & JAMES FUSI, SPAIN: DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY (1979);
JOHN COVERDALE, THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF SPAIN AFTER FRANCO (1979); and PE-
TER PRESTON, SPAIN IN CRISIS (1976).
75. James Malefakis, Spain and Its Francoist Heritage, in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DE-
MOCRACY 225 (J. Henz ed., 1982).
76. Id. at 226.
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was free to map the transition to democracy. 7
The issue of amnesty was defused. In July 1976 and March 1977, all
political prisoners were released.78 Those in the police and military who
were responsible for the gross human rights abuses that had occurred in
the 1940s and 1950s had either died or, if still alive, were retired. Memo-
ries of the past brutality had sufficiently faded so that redress never be-
came a major issue. The people of Spain appeared content with utterly
repudiating the Francoist past at the polls.
78
Since 1975, Spain has witnessed a remarkable series of events: the
dismantling of the 36-year-old Franco fascist/military dictatorship; its re-
placement in 1979 with a constitutionally elected government; and in
1982, 1986, and 1989, the election of Socialist majorities in the Spanish
Parliament. Today Spain stands as one of the more stable parliamentary
democracies in Europe.8 0
2. Greece
In 1967, George Papadopoulos established the military dictatorship
of "the Colonels" in the nation renowned as the birthplace of Western
democracy. In the early stages of his regime, Papadopoulos spoke of pro-
viding a transition to parliamentary democracy, but the deeds of his dic-
tatorship served instead to halt and reverse the process of democratiza-
tion. Maladministration, scandal, corruption, and human rights abuses,
including the systematic use of torture, became hallmarks of the regime.8 '
The immediate cause of the Colonels' loss of power was its ill-con-
ceived military adventure in Cyprus in 1974. This foolish act gave Turkey
the excuse it needed to seize a section of the island. Senior Greek military
officers who had previously supported the establishment of the Papado-
poulos junta8 2 decided that a return to civilian rule was appropriate to
prevent the military disaster that would result from a full-scale war with
Turkey.
A new government was immediately formed under the leadership of
exiled former premier Constantine Karamanlis. The military attempted
77. Remarks of Professor Howard J. Wiarda, American University Symposium, supra
note 1, at 1026-27.
78. Malefakis, supra note 75, at 226.
79. Id. at 223 & 227.
80. Fred Lopez, Bourgeois State and the Rise of Social Democracy in Spain, in RON-
ALD H. CHILCOTE, TRANSITIONS FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 17 (1990).
81. See generally CONSTANTINE TSOUCALAS, THE GREEK TRAGEDY (1969). See also
Kourvetaris, The Role of the Military in Greek Politics, 8 INT'L REV. HIST. & POL. SCI. 91
(1971); see generally RICHARD CLOGG & GEORGE YANNOPOILos, GREECE UNDER MILITARY
RULE (1972), R. ROUFAS, INSIDE THE COLONELS' GREECE (1972) and RICHARD CLOGG, A SHORT
HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE (1979).
82. Harry Psomiades, Greece: From the Colonels' Rule to Democracy, in FROM DICTA-
TORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 252-55 (J. Henz ed., 1982); S. Hadjiyannis, Democratization and the
Greek State, in CHILCOTE, supra note 80, at 131, 132-39.
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to barter for an amnesty, but to no avail. Karamanlis initiated a series of
decrees aimed at both redress and setting Greece on the road to democ-
racy. All political prisoners were released. Over 100,000 civil servants who
had served between 1967 and 1974 were either disciplined, transferred, or
dismissed. The Military Police were stripped of the authority that had
made them a dreaded instrument of the dictatorship.
3
In late October 1974, the five ringleaders of the 1967 coup, including
Papadopoulos, were arrested. A few days later, they were officially
charged with high treason84 along with 44 former officers. Their trials re-
ceived widespread radio, television, and press coverage and highlighted
the gross human rights abuses of the 1967-74 era. Eighteen of the military
leaders were convicted with sentences ranging from substantial time in
prison to death. To avoid any possibility of creating martyrs, the death
sentences were immediately commuted to life imprisonment.8 5
Other trials followed that were more controversial. 6 Offenders who
had "turned state's evidence" escaped prosecution. Some who were con-
victed were set free after paying modest fines or were given suspended
sentences. No compensation, except reinstatement in jobs where possible,
was provided for the victims of torture.
Nevertheless, the Greek experience stands in sharp contrast to that
of most other countries that have made the transition to democracy. The
Karamanlis government brought to justice those most responsible for the
gross human rights abuses of the Colonels' rule."
3. Eastern Europe
The recent transition from dictatorships to elected civilian rule in
Eastern Europe resulted from increasing economic hardships, bankrupt
ideology, and the loosening of the Soviet grip on the region. One of the
questions now facing the new governments is how best to deal with past
human rights abuses. 8 Two examples serve to illustrate the problems.
a. East Germany
The East German communist regime collapsed in 1989. Erich Ho-
necker, the former dictator who is charged with responsibility for the
deaths of more than 200 persons shot while trying to escape across the
border to West Germany, and former state security (Stasi) Minister Erich
Mielke, were scheduled for trial. The 78-year old Honecker was, however,
83. Psomiades, supra note 82, at 255.
84. Id. at 255.
85. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN GREECE: THE FIRST TORTURERS' TRIAL, 1975
(1977).
86. Psomiades, supra note 82, at 265.
87. Id.
88. Paul Taylor, Human Rights Accords, Once Dead Letter, Flourish in E. Europe,
REUTER LIBR. REP., Nov. 13, 1990.
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spirited out of Germany in March 1991 in a Soviet military aircraft, os-
tensibly for medical treatment.8 9 Mielke, age 83, is said to be senile. 90 On
May 21, 1991, Willi Stoph (the former prime minister), Heinz Kessler
(the former defense minister), Fritz Streletz (the former secretary of the
National Defense Council), and Hans Albrecht (another Council member)
were also arrested for their participation in adopting the shoot-to-kill or-
der in 1974."'
Beyond these former leaders, the major question confronting the new
united German government is how to deal with the more than 100,000
former Stasi agents and the much larger number of persons who collabo-
rated with them in violating human rights in East Germany. 92 According
to the newspaper Der Morgen: "There is only a vague hope of more trials
against those who ruled East Germany close to bankruptcy, ignored
human rights and almost succeeded in robbing the 17-million-strong pop-
ulation of its dignity."93
b. Romania
Romania held its first multiparty parliamentary and presidential
elections in fifty years in May 1990, five months after Nicolae Ceausescu's
rule was overthrown in what appeared to be a popular revolt. In fact,
coup plans had been in the works for more than a decade. When nation-
wide demonstrations began in December 1989, Ceausescu loyalists within
the Romanian Army, who had been firing on the demonstrators, suddenly
switched sides on December 21, and backed the National Salvation Front
(F.N.S.). Days later, after Ceausescu's execution, the bulk of those re-
sponsible for past human rights abuses - the specialized paramilitary
police force known as the Securitate - laid down their weapons. It was
obvious that a deal had been struck so that the military and Securitate
would not be held accountable.94
Although the government of President Ion Iliescu has conducted
show trials of Ceausescu's son and brother (a former general) and some
former Securitate leaders, it is clear that nothing more will be done to
bring to justice to those responsible for past human rights abuses. In fact,
had Iliescu been unable to suppress the June 1990 demonstration in
89. John Tagliabue, 4 Ex-Officials of East Germany Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (Nat'l ed.),
May 22, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
90. Christian Burckhardt, First Former East German Leader Goes on Trial, REUTER
LIaR. REP., Jan. 19, 1990.
91. Tagliabue, supra note 89.
92. Allen Kinzer, Germany's New Custodian of Stasi Secrets Insists on Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, at A12, col. 1.
93. Burckhardt, supra note 90.
94. Paul Hockenos, Romania a Year Later: The Winter of Our Discontentment, THE
NATION, Jan. 7, 1991, at 14.
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Bucharest's University Square, the military and Securitate would proba-
bly have reasserted themselves in the name of law and order. 9
5
C. East Asia
The Asia/Pacific region is the only part of the world without a re-
gional human rights charter.96 One reason may be the size and diversity
of this region. Another reason, particularly applicable to East Asia
(China, Japan, and Korea), is the legacy of Confucianism, which tends to




South Korea's recent experiment in moving from authoritarian rule
to democracy has not included a major examination of past human rights
abuses. Roh Tae Woo, a former general and confidant of former dictator
Chun Doo Huan, was elected president in 1987, in Korea's first free elec-
tion; since then this Asian nation of some forty-two million has resisted a
return to military rule.98 Major problems nonetheless remain.
Critics cite continuing human rights violations, particularly infringe-
ments on student and labor organizations. They also note that the perva-
sive internal security apparatus and the laws that supported three de-
cades of oppression under military rule are still in place. 99 Roh's October
1990 "war on crime" has brought charges of human rights abuses by both
Amnesty International and Asia Watch. 00
Roh's government has acted to redress some past human rights
transgressions, but with a rather obvious attempt to balance the punish-
ment of past misdeeds against a desire to counter demonstrations against
Roh's leadership. In one recent case, Kwon In-sok, who was sexually
abused by a police detective after her arrest in 1986, was awarded forty
million won ($58,000) and the police detective was sentenced to five years
in jail.'0 ' Yet in another incident involving the pre-1987 detention of la-
bor activist Kim Keun-tae, despite the fact that the government itself
provided evidence of torture, the case against the four accused police of-
ficers remains on hold. 10
2
95. Id.
96. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Prospects for the Development of Intergovern-
mental Human Rights Bodies in Asia and the Pacific, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS, 51, 52 (E. Lutz, H. Hannum & K. Burke eds., 1989).
97. Id. at 56.
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2. Philippines
Human rights violations were a central issue giving new momentum
to the "People Power" revolution that ousted dictator Ferdinand Marcos
in February 1986. President Corazon Aquino acted immediately to release
all political prisoners and to establish a Presidential Committee on
Human Rights to investigate past abuses. A new constitution was drafted
that insured the dignity of every human and guaranteed full respect for
human rights. °10
Primarily because of the fragility of the Aquino government, how-
ever, little has been done in the Philippines to bring to justice those re-
sponsible for past human rights transgressions. The Aquino government's
main contribution has been to support civil suits in the United States
against Marcos family members for the human rights crimes perpetrated
during the Marcos era."0
IV. "UNIVERSAL" FORUMS FOR REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
The mixed pattern of national responses to human rights abuses de-
scribed above indicates that some back-up or fail-safe systems are needed
to buttress each nation's ability to redress the abuses that occurred dur-
ing the previous authoritarian regime. If international law does indeed
require that all serious violations of physical integrity be punished,
10 5
then the mechanisms of international law should be called upon to assist
this process. Although these mechanisms are still in a primitive and
evolving state, they can serve to reinforce national resolve and assist
where the nation may feel inadequate to address the task.
A. The Global Forum - The Human Rights Committee, Geneva
More than fifty nations have now ratified the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 0 6 which allows
citizens to bring complaints against their own government. The Human
Rights Committee consists of eighteen experts elected by those nations
that have ratified the Covenant, and they are now actively evaluating
complaints and issuing opinions concerning the alleged human rights
abuses. Some of their opinions have addressed major human rights
abuses, and they have already established interpretive norms on the
Aug. 3, 1990, at A2, col. 1.
103. Ben Cohen, Warning: Joining the Bar is Hazardous to Your Health, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Nov. 3, 1988, at 80-81; The New Constitution of the Philippines, 38 THE REVIEW,
INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS 12 (1987).
104. Cohen, supra note 103. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, MDL No. 840 (1991) (a class action suit on behalf of all the victims of torture
and murder in the Phillipines during the Marcos martial law era; trial is scheduled for Au-
gust 1992).
105. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
106. ICCPR, supra note 8.
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meaning of many of the provisions of the Covenant.
One of the first decisions of the Committee in 1979, for instance,
dealt with torture in Uruguay and the Committee concluded that torture
and other inhumane treatment had occurred.1 0 7 During this early period,
the Committee established the rule that if a nation did not respond to the
Committee's request for information about a complaint, "the Committee
may consider such allegations as substantiated in the absence of satisfac-
tory evidence and explanations to the contrary submitted by the State
party."' 0 8 Once a complaint is received, therefore, the burden shifts to the
government to respond to it, and if the government provides only vague
or conclusory comments the Committee will accept the allegations as
true.
Another early case involved the summary execution of fifteen promi-
nent citizens by the Suriname government in 1982. The Committee ruled
that this action had violated their right to life and ruled that the govern-
ment had a duty to compensate the families of the victims. 0 9 Although
the Committee does not have the power to enforce its rulings, it is ex-
pected that the courts of each contracting party to the Covenant will en-
force them.
These and the many similar opinions that the Human Rights Com-
mittee is issuing should provide a strong framework for providing redress
for human rights abuses, and should reinforce the obligation of each na-
tion to protect human rights.
B. The Regional Forums
Three regional human rights conventions are now operational in Eu-
rope, the Western Hemisphere, and Africa. 1 0 Each allows individuals to
bring complaints, and nations can also bring complaints against other na-
tions in some circumstances. The most dramatic case relevant to re-
dressing abuses is the case brought by Denmark, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, and Sweden against Greece during the period of the Colonels. 1' The
European Human Rights Commission established a Subcommission to ex-
amine the merits of the case, but after some initial cooperation the Colo-
107. Uruguay Human Rights Case, 16 U.N. CHRONICLE 66 (July-Oct. 1979). See also,
e.g., Case of Hiber Conteris, Communication No. 139/1983; CCPR/C/25/D/139/1983 (July
23, 1985) (concluding that Uruguay had violated the complainant's human rights through
extreme ill-treatment during periods of confinement).
108. Hiber Conteris, supra, note 107.
109. Communications Nos. 146/1983 and 148-54/1983; CCPR/C/24/D/146/148-154/1983
(April 4, 1985).
110. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, supra
note 8; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8; African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, done at Banjul, June 27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982).
111. The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuM. RTS (1969) (Eur. Comm'n on Hum.
Rts). See James Becket, The Greek Case Before the European Human Rights Commission,
1 HuM. RTS. J. 91 (1970).
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nels refused to allow the Subcommission members to visit certain notori-
ous prisons. The Subcommission and then the full Commission prepared
a report condemning Greece, and the Committee of Ministers was pre-
pared to vote on a proposal to suspend Greece from the Council of Eu-
rope in December 1969 when Greece walked out of the meeting and then
withdrew from the Council and the European Convention. European
banks withdrew financing from Greece; because of the economic hard-
ships and the invasion of Cyprus described above, " 2 the Colonels were
overthrown and democracy returned.113 The new government then prose-
cuted the abusive military leaders in the most successful example of a full
redress.
In the Inter-American system, the Velasquez Rodriguez Case"
4
states that affirmative obligations exist to investigate human rights
abuses and make a full accounting. This decision establishes a strong pre-
cedent and indicates that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
and Court will be vigilant in trying to ensure that human rights abuses
are properly redressed.
C. The Domestic Forums of Other Nations
Another useful way to redress human rights abuses is to bring civil
suits against the abusers if they should seek asylum or a safe haven in
another country. In the United States, these actions have been successful
in recent years under the Alien Tort Claims Act," 5 which provides juris-
diction for aliens suing for torts committed in violation of international
law. Suits brought by victims of torture and murder and their families
against human rights abusers from Paraguay,"" Argentina,' " and the
Philippines" 8 (for abuses that have occurred in those countries) have led
to verdicts in favor of the victims and their families. Collecting judgments
remains a challenge, but the principle appears to have been firmly estab-
lished that U.S. courts will provide a forum for human rights cases if per-
sonal jurisdiction can be obtained over an alleged abuser.
D. Other Remedies
Extra-legal remedies are also possible, although they present risks of
112. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
113. FRANK NEWMAN AND DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 478-79
(1990).
114. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See also Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-25,
CONG. REC. H11244 (signed into law March 12, 1992).
116. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
117. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987) and 694 F.Supp. 707
(N.D.Cal. 1988).
118. Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207 (May 13, 1991)(award of $4.5 million to the
family of a young man tortured and killed, against Imee Marcos).
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destabilizing the legal system. Kidnappings " have occurred, as in the
Eichmann situation where Israeli agents entered Argentina and spirited
the administrator of the death camps back to Israel for trial."10 Although
Israel was scolded for this act by the U.N. Security Council, Argentina
did not object with any vigor, and Israel's assertion that it could assert
universal jurisdiction over Eichmann's heinous crimes has been accepted.
The United States' actions in Panama in December 1989 which led to the
seizure of General Manuel Noriega are similar in some respects. The
United States justified its entry as necessary to protect vital national in-
terests and to free Panama from the burdens of an authoritarian
dictator."12
The concept of "humanitarian intervention" has become increasingly
recognized, although it remains highly controversial. 2 When, if ever, do
human rights abuses justify intervention by one or more countries into
another to free the citizens of that country? Although few commentators
are willing to give a green light to this type of activity because of its sus-
ceptibility to abuse, examples can be found of this type of intervention
and it is frequently met with general approval.
V. CONCLUSION
The momentum toward freedom and the protection of individual and
group rights has been steadily increasing in recent years, and it appears
as if we may be on the threshold of an era in which the goal of universal
respect for human rights is at hand. To hasten the movement toward this
important goal and to secure the gains that have already been made, it is
useful to identify and punish in a full and formal manner those govern-
ment officials who have abused their positions of power by seriously vio-
lating the physical integrity of their citizens. A strong argument can be
made that international law already requires such an accounting, and
even if it does not such prosecutions can be justified as necessary to deter
future misconduct and ensure that the historical record of the past mis-
conduct is accurate.
Most new democracies have, however, been unwilling or unable to
embark on this path. Except for Greece, the efforts to redress the human
rights abuses have been disappointing. It is necessary for the interna-
tional community to assist newly emerging democracies so that they do
not have to shoulder the entire burden of punishing the members of the
authoritarian regime that previously governed. International and regional
119. See generally Recent Development, The Domestic and International Legal Impli-
cations of the Abduction of Criminals from Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 573 (1990);
and United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 91-712 (argued before the Supreme Court April
1, 1992).
120. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, Israel, Supreme Court 1962, 36 INT'L L.
REP. 277 (1968).
121. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
122. See Ved Nanda's article in this issue.
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human rights bodies can assist greatly by adjudicating disputes and
clearly articulating the rules that govern these situations. National courts
of other nations should also be receptive to providing jurisdiction for civil
suits.
Redressing human rights abuses is not a matter of vengeance, but
one of simple justice. The victims deserve the dignity of a full redress,
and the commitment to a rule of law and democratic principles can be
greatly strengthened by this process. The process of developing and
strengthening international and regional human rights mechanisms
should greatly assist the achievement of this goal.

